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T HE title of this paper is broader than its content. At the begin-
ning of the October, 1956, term, close to seventy labor cases were
posted on the United States Supreme Court's docket.' Many of
these have not yet been decided. Of those that have been decided,
a number may be set to one side as not within the scope of this
paper. The main inquiry of this article will be to ascertain what
the Supreme Court has done during the current term concerning
the Taft-Hartley Act.'
Space considerations impel a further restriction on the subject
matter of this paper. The cases on which the Supreme Court has
written will be fully discussed. Cases which have been disposed of
without opinion will be touched upon only lightly.
PREEMPTION
The liveliest topic in labor law today is that of preemption. To
what extent does the Taft-Hartley Act preempt the field of labor
law and preclude state agencies and courts from acting? Much has
been written on this question, and uncertainties abound.3 Three
decisions handed down on March 25, 1957, demonstrate that the
preemption doctrine is expanding rather than contracting.
In Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board4 petitioner employer was
a manufacturer of specialized photographic equipment. In 1953
the United Steelworkers of America requested the National Labor
Relations Board (NRLB) to certify it as the collective bargaining
representative of the employees. A consent election was won by the
*Paper presented at the Sixth Institute on Labor Law (April 25 and 26, 1957), sponsored
by Southern Methodist University Law School and the Southwestern Legal Foundation.
tProfessor of Law, Southern Methodist University; member of the Texas Bar, arbitrator
in many labor disputes, and author of numerous articles in various law journals.
'See compilation in 39 LRRM 19 (November 12, 1956).
261 STAT. 136 (June 23, 1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1952). The official name of the
legislation is "Labor Management Relations Act, 1947." The Act has five Titles, the first of
which comprises the amended National Labor Relations Act. The original National Labor
Relations Act was passed in 1935 and was popularly known as the Wagner Act. 49 STAT.
449, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1946).
aThe leading cases are Garner v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954); Weber v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
4 77 Sup. Ct. 598.
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union, and the NRLB issued its certification. Shortly thereafter the
union filed charges of unfair labor practices. In the meantime the
Board revised its jurisdictional standards. The Board's regional di-
rector refused to issue a complaint on the union's charges because
the employer's operations "were predominantly local in character,
and it ... [did] not appear that it would effectuate the policies of
the Act to exercise jurisdiction."
The union then filed substantially the same charges with the
Utah Labor Relations Board. The employer urged that the State
Board was without jurisdiction. The State Board held to the con-
trary and granted a remedial order. The Utah Supreme Court af-
firmed. The United States Supreme Court reversed and held the
State Board without jurisdiction.
The question before the Supreme Court was "whether Congress,
by vesting in the National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction over
labor relations matters affecting interstate commerce, has com-
pletely displaced state power to deal with such matters where the
Board has declined or obviously would decline to exercise its juris-
diction but has not ceded jurisdiction pursuant to the proviso to
§10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act."' The cited section
empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices affecting in-
terstate commerce. The power is not affected by any other means
of adjustment or prevention,
Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency
of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any
cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communica-
tions, and transportation except where predominantly local in charac-
ter) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting -com-
merce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable
to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with
the corresponding provision of this Act or has received a construction
inconsistent therewith.
Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the Court. He
noted that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts were intended by
Congress to reach the full extent of its power under the Commerce
Clause. But the NRLB had never, from its inception, exercised the
full measure of its jurisdiction. For a number of years the Board
decided from case to case whether to take jurisdiction. In 1950 and
1954 it announced certain standards governing its exercise of juris-




light zone' between exercised federal jurisdiction and unquestioned
state jurisdiction."'
The proviso to §10(a) was an amendment to the original Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, adopted in response to Bethlehem Steel
Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.' In that case the New
York Labor Relations Board had certified a foremen's union at a
time when the NRLB did not recognize units of foremen as appro-
priate for collective bargaining. The employer's business clearly af-
fected interstate commerce. The Supreme Court held that the
NLRB's policy against certifying foremen's units should prevail.
This was a case in which the NLRB had dealt with a problem in a
particular way, and the state agency was not permitted to deal with
it in a different way. The Court had occasion to speak of cases in
which the NLRB expressly cedes jurisdiction to a state agency or
simply declines jurisdiction "for budgetary or other reasons."
Language in the main and concurring opinions threw doubt on
whether a state board could act either after a formal cession by the
Board or upon a declination of jurisdiction "for budgetary or other
reasons."
In the Guss case the Court was of the opinion that the proviso
to §10(a) was intended to deal with all situations in which the
Board declined to exercise jurisdiction which it had. Therefore, the
only way in which a state board could assume jurisdiction over an
employer in or affecting interstate commerce was by an agreed-
upon cession on the part of the NLRB. The cession would be valid
only if the state statute and interpretations thereof were consistent
with federal law. The Court felt that Congress meant to insure that
national labor policy should not be altered even in the predomi-
nantly local enterprises to which the proviso applied.
The Court conceded that its decision might create a "vast no-
man's land, subject to regulation by no agency or court."' But it
was believed that Congress intended that uniformity in labor rela-
tions law should be promoted. Congress was free to change the
situation if it desired.
In Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats' plaintiff
operated three meat markets in Akron, Ohio. The business affected
interstate commerce and was subject to the Taft-Hartley Act. It
was assumed that the NLRB would decline to exercise jurisdiction
'Ibid.
330 U.S. 767 (1947).
'77 Sup. Ct. at 603.
9 Id. at 604.
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over plaintiff's business. Defendant union was unsuccessful in try-
ing to organize plaintiff's employees, but asked plaintiff for collec-
tive bargaining privileges and a union shop contract. Plaintiff re-
fused, and the union picketed and brought secondary pressure on
plaintiff's suppliers. Plaintiff obtained an injunction in the state
court on the ground that the union's picketing was unlawful and
contrary to Ohio policy.
The U. S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded.
Citing the Guss case, the Court said, "If the proviso to §10(a) ...
operates to exclude state labor boards from disputes within the Na-
tional Board's jurisdiction in the absence of cession agreement, it
must also exclude state courts .... The conduct here restrained-an
effort by a union not representing a majority of his employees to
compel an employer to agree to a union shop contract-is conduct
of which the National Act has taken hold .... Garner v. Teamsters,
etc., Union'0 teaches that in such circumstances a State cannot af-
ford a remedy parallel to that provided by the Act.""
The Court stated that the Amalgamated Meat Cutters case was
an excellent example of why the proviso to §10 (a) should be strictly
construed in order to achieve uniformity in national policy. It ap-
peared that defendant union charged plaintiff employer with unfair
labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act. The state
court took no account of the alleged unfair labor practices, and one
could not be sure that the decree was consistent with the Act.
In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon" plaintiffs were a
partnership operating two retail lumber yards in San Diego Coun-
ty, California. Defendant unions requested a collective bargaining
contract with a union shop provision. Plaintiffs refused on the
ground that compliance with the request before the unions had
majority support among the employees would be an unfair labor
practice. The defendant unions peacefully picketed. Plaintiffs sued
for injunction in a California superior court and at the same time
filed a petition with the NLRB asking that the question concern-
ing representation be resolved. The latter petition was dismissed.
Thereafter the superior court issued an injunction and awarded
$1000 damages. The judgment was affirmed in the California Su-
preme Court. It was ruled that the NLRB's declination of jurisdic-
tion left the state court free to act and that peaceful picketing to
10346 U.S. 485 (1953).
" 77 Sup. Ct. at 606.
12 77 Sup. Ct. 607.
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obtain a union shop in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act was contrary to California law.
The U. S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded
on the basis of the Guss and Amalgamated Meat Cutters decisions.
With respect to the award of damages the Court referred to United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co.3 as sustaining a money
judgment under state tort law for violent conduct. The Court was
uncertain that the California court would have allowed damages if
it had known that the injunction would be vacated. Without decid-
ing whether the money judgment could stand, the Court remanded
the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Justice Burton wrote a dissenting opinion for all three cases, with
Justice Clark concurring. The view was expressed that the pro-
viso to § 10(a) merely made clear that the NLRB could enter into
cession agreements with state or territorial agencies. The dissenters
disagreed that the proviso prevented the states from acting on mat-
ters over which the Board, for one reason or another, declined to
exercise its full jurisdiction. Where the Board declined (or obviously
would decline) jurisdiction, federal power was said to lie "dormant
and unexercised," and the states had power to act.
The dissent pointed out that the proviso to §10 (a) was so re-
stricted that no cession agreement had been made under it. Hence
there was an "extensive no-man's land" within which no federal or
state agency or court could deal with labor controversies. It was
hard to believe that "Congress, sub silentio, intended to take such a
step backward in the field of labor relations."' 4 The dissenting
justices thought it likely that Congress intended the states to work
out their own labor-management solutions where the NLRB chose
not to exercise its jurisdiction.
This writer has a preference for the views expressed by the
dissenters. It is easy to say that if the prevailing view is wrong,
Congress has the power to correct the error. As a practical matter,
however, a change in a federal statute, even the addition or dele-
tion of a few words, is a formidable undertaking. Much can be
said for putting this burden on those who advocate broad pre-
emption by the Taft-Hartley Act. One may presume that the states
continue to have jurisdiction over matters they have dealt with for
decades. If they are to be precluded from acting on such matters,
one would expect a clear statement of Congressional intent.
It is true that the proviso to §10 (a) gives rise to an implication
13347 U.S. 656 (1954).
14 77 Sup. Ct. at 611.
[Vol. I11
RECENT LABOR DECISIONS
that cession agreements are the only way in which states can be
empowered to act on disputes in or affecting interstate commerce.
On the other hand, there is good reason to believe that Congress had
no notion of precluding state action so completely as has come to
pass under the premption decisions.15 The uniformity of law con-
sideration mentioned by the majority of the Court seems hollow.
The effect of these decisions is that no procedure, administrative or
judicial, is available to resolve controversies affecting interstate
commerce. This is absence of law, not uniformity of law. Perhaps
the situation is more favorable to unions than to employers, since
many states are prone to impose restrictions on union activities. But
it is to be remembered that the constitutional guaranty of free
speech still affords a considerable measure of protection to union
activities. Also, the preemption doctrine cuts two ways. In the Guss
case a union was prevented from securing relief from unfair labor
practices.
Doubt is to be expressed that calamitous consequences would
follow if the states were permitted to act where the NLRB chooses
not to exercise its jurisdiction. Advantages might well accrue from
learning how different states solve their labor problems. This ap-
proach would have regard for one of the great attributes of the
federal-state system.
In summary, the present status of the preemption doctrine
seems to be this: With respect to peaceful union activities, directed
toward organization and collective bargaining, state courts and
administrative agencies are precluded from acting if the complain-
ing employer is in or affects interstate commerce. The same may
be said as to employer unfair labor practices which do not descend
to the level of force, fraud or trespass. With respect to gross forms
of intimidation and trespass, the states may afford either judicial
or administrative remedies.
A footnote to the preemption doctrine is to be found in Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo." In this case the Supreme Court held
that the Taft-Hartley Act had no application to a vessel owned by
a foreign corporation and manned by nationals of countries other
than the United States. Three unions in Portland, Oregon, suc-
cessively picketed the vessel in behalf of the crew. In consequence
'5 See Petro, Labor Relations Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 269 (1957); Petro, Participation
by the States in the Enforcement and Development of National Labor Policy, 28 NoTrE
DAME LAW. 1, 38-41 (1952); cf. Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64
HARV. L. REv. 211, 224, 226-31 (1950); Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdic-
tion over Labor Relations, 46 MICH. L. REv. 593, 606-13 (1948).
1677 Sup. Ct. 699 (1957).
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the ship was detained in Portland for many weeks. Injunction was
issued by a federal district court against each union on the basis
of Oregon law. The specific ground was that the purpose of the
picketing was a breach of contract: to secure more favorable terms
and conditions of employment than had been agreed to when the
vessel began its voyage. The ship sailed after the last injunction was
granted, and thereafter the three injunctions were vacated as moot.
However, judgment for damages was secured against the principal
representatives of the unions. The U. S. Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment and rejected defendants' argument that the Taft-Hartley
Act precluded the granting of a remedy under state law. The Court
was of the opinion that Congress did not intend to subject foreign
ships with foreign crews to the Taft-Hartley Act. The danger of
international discord and retaliative action was adverted to as
supporting the Court's ruling. The Court said, "For us to run inter-
ference in such a delicate field of international relations there must
be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly ex-
pressed."17
LOCKOUT AS AN ANSWER TO WHIPSAW STRIKES
At common law the lockout is regarded as the employer's count-
erpart of the employees' right to strike. Under the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts the right to lock out employees has gone into
eclipse. Definitely, the right to lock out may not be exercised with
the same freedom as the right to strike. When collective bargaining
goes slowly, an employer may not lock out his employees except in
unusual circumstances. To do so is to interfere with the employees'
right to engage in concerted activities and in collective bargaining.
The exceptional circumstances in which a lockout is permitted have
been restricted to those in which an employer fairly anticipates a
strike and will suffer special, excessive losses by failing to curtail his
operations.
The so-called "whipsaw strike" tactic is another circumstance
which now privileges an employer to lock out his employees. In
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, AFL," eight employers in the linen supply business
comprised the Linen and Credit Exchange. For 13 years the Ex-
change and the union bargained on a multi-employer basis and
negotiated successive collective bargaining agreements. Sixty days
17id. at 704.
"s77 Sup. Ct. 643 (1957).
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before the expiration of such an agreement on April 30, 1953, the
union gave notice of its desire to negotiate changes.
Bargaining began before April 30 and carried on past that date.
On May 26 the union struck and picketed one of the employers.
The next day the other employers laid off their truck drivers. The
union was notified that this action was taken because of the strike
and that the laid-off drivers would be recalled when the strike and
picketing were ended. Negotiations on the contract continued, and
a week later agreement was reached. The strike then ended, and
the laid-off truck drivers were recalled.
The union filed charges against the seven employers, alleging that
the layoff was a lockout interfering with the employees' rights
guaranteed under §§ 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Taft-Hartley Act.
A complaint issued, and a trial examiner found the employers
guilty of unfair labor practices. The NLRB overruled the trial
examiner, making "the more reasonable inference . . . that, al-
though not specifically announced by the Union, the strike against
the one employer necessarily carried with it an implied threat of
future action against any or all of the other members of the
Association," with the "calculated purpose" of causing "successive
and individual employer capitulations.""' In the absence of proof
of anti-union motivation, the employers' action was "defensive and
privileged in nature rather than retaliatory and unlawful."2
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Board,
stating that a "temporary lockout of employees on a 'mere threat
of or in anticipation of, a strike,' could be justified only if there
were unusual economic hardship.""1 Because no such economic
justification appeared, the lockout was held an interference with
the right of employees to engage in concerted activities.
The U. S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and
affirmed the NLRB. The opinion was written by Justice Brennan
for a unanimous Court. Observation was made that the term "lock-
out" is used in several places in the Taft-Hartley Act. The indica-
tion was that in some circumstances the employer may use this
economic weapon. Put to one side were cases in which the lockout
was used aggressively to frustrate organizational efforts, to under-
mine or destroy bargaining representation, or to evade the duty to
bargain collectively.





1 231 F.2d 110, 113 (1'956).
1957]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
units under the Taft-Hartley Act and noted their wide incidence
throughout the United States. Some four million employees were
said to be governed by collective bargaining agreements signed by
unions and thousands of employer associations. The "compelling
conclusion" for the Court was that Congress intended that the
Board should continue to have discretion to certify multi-employer
bargaining units. This conclusion was stated in answer to the
Court of Appeals' argument that multi-employer units had not
been sanctioned by Congress and that the employers in the instant
case had no valid interest to preserve the integrity of such a unit.
The Supreme Court was of the opinion that small employers had
an interest "in preserving multi-employer bargaining as a means of
bargaining on an equal basis with a large union and avoiding the
competitive disadvantages resulting from non-uniform contractual
terms,"2 The NLRB had discretion to decide that employers might
use self-help in the form of a lockout to preserve the integrity of
a multi-employer bargaining unit and to meet a strike called against
one of them.
RIGHT TO STRIKE AFTER DUE NOTICE OF DESIRE TO RE-OPEN
CONTRACT
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co."3 decided an important question concern-
ing the right of a union to strike after giving 60 days' notice of
reopening the terms of a collective bargaining contract. Respondent
company and the Oil Workers International Union entered into
contract on October 2, 1950. The contract could be terminated
at yearly intervals, provided notice of desire to amend was given
60 days before October 23. If agreement was not reached during
the 60-day period, either party could terminate the contract on 60
days' notice.
On August 24, 1951, the union served proper written notice
on the company of its desire to modify the contract. Negotiations
continued over a period of several months. The union voted to
strike on February 14, 1952, but the strike was postponed three
times and did not take place until April 30, 1952. At no time did
the union give notice of termination of the contract.
On August 3, 1952, a new contract was executed, and the strik-
ers returned to work. The union filed charges of unfair labor
practices based on certain actions of the company during the strike.
The company contended that the strike was a violation of §8 (d) (4)
:2 77 Sup. Ct. at 648.
2377 Sup. Ct. 330 (1957).
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of the National Labor Relations Act, depriving the strikers of em-
ployee status and rights under the Act. The NLRB ruled that after
the 60-day notice expired, the Act was complied with and the em-
ployees were free to strike. Accordingly, a cease and desist order
issued, along with an award of back pay. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit set aside the Board's order on the ground that the
collective bargaining contract continued in effect and that the right
to strike did not arise until the contract was terminated by 60 days'
notice.24 The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the Board's order.
The first sentence of Section 8 (d) defines the duty of employers
and unions to bargain collectively. A lengthy proviso follows:
Provided, That where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract
covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to
bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract
shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring
such termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract
of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the
expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no ex-
piration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such
termination or modification; ... and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike
or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a
period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration
date of such contract, whichever occuars later.
... [A]nd the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring
either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and
conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modifica-
tion is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be
reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who en-
gages in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsec-
tion shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in
the particular labor dispute ....
The Supreme Court stated that the sole question presented by
writ of certiorari was:
Whether the requirement of this Section is satisfied where a contract
provides for negotiation and adoption of modifications at an inter-
mediate date during its term, and a strike in support of modification
demands occurs after the date on which such modifications may become
effective-and after the 60-day notice period has elapsed-but prior
to the terminal date of the contract.25
24221 F.2d 231 (1955).
2577 Sup. Ct. at 332.
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Comment was made that a decided trend had developed among
employers and unions to enter into contracts of longer duration
than formerly and to provide for reopening during the contract
term. Hence the question before the Court was of considerable
significance.
The Court noted the use of the words, "termination," "modifica-
tion" and "expiration" in the proviso to §8 (d). Notice of desired
modification "would typically be served in advance of the date when
the contract by its own terms was subject to modification," while
notice of desired termination "would ordinarily precede the date
when the contract would come to an end by its own terms or
would be automatically renewed in the absence of notice to term-
inate.""6 The conclusion was that the expression, "expiration date," in
§8 (d) (1) and (4) encompassed both situations. Support for this
interpretation was found in the next to the last sentence of the
proviso, relieving either party to a contract from discussing or
agreeing "to any modification of the terms and conditions contained
in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become
effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under
the provisions of the contract." The implication of this declaration
was that there is a duty to bargain over modifications when the
contract contemplates such bargaining. The Court said it would
be anomalous for Congress to recognize "such a duty and at the
same time deprive the Union of the threat strike which, together
with 'the occasional strike itself, is the force depended upon to
facilitate arriving at satisfactory agreements.' ... The Court also
observed that the Joint Committee on Labor Management Relations,
made up of members of the Congress which passed the Taft-Hartley
Act, reached the conclusion that after the statutory notice of
desired modification is given, a union has the right to strike."6
Since the union called the strike long after the 60-day notice of
request for modification was given, it had a right to strike, even
though no notice of termination of the contract was given. The
Court brushed aside the company's argument that the contract
was violated. The agreement contained no expressed waiver of the
right to strike, and waiver was not to be inferred. NLRB v. Sands
Mfg. Co.," was distinguished as a case in which employees struck
in violation of a contract which did not contain any reopening
2I id. at 3 3 5.
27 Ibid.
" Citing S. REP. No. 986, Pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1948).
2"306 U.S. 332 (1939).
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clause. Here the employees could be discharged. In the instant case
the Court did not believe "that the two-phase provision for term-
inating this contract ... [meant] that it was not within the con-
templation of the parties that economic weapons might be used to
support demands for modification before the notice to terminate
was given.""
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred for the main part but
dissented from the Court's passing on the employer's defense of
breach of contract. They felt that the case should be remanded to
the court of appeals to determine if an agreement not to strike
should be implied and whether respondent company had continued
to regard the strikers as employees.
The Court's interpretation of the proviso to §8 (d) is to be
commended. It makes common sense that the parties understand
that when a reopening of a collective bargaining contract occurs, they
assume the positions they occupy when a new contract is negotiated.
There is ambiguity in the proviso to §8 (d), but the language may
fairly be read to recognize that the right to strike revives after the
statutory notice is given or after the reopening date, whichever
is later.
UNION EXPENDITURES IN CONNECTION WITH FEDERAL ELECTIONS
In United States v. International Union, UAW-CIO,3" an indict-
ment was brought against the union for using general treasury
funds to pay for television broadcasts advocating the selection of
certain persons to be candidates for representatives and senator to
the Congress of the United States. The federal district court dis-
missed the indictment on the ground that it did not state an offense
under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act." On direct appeal the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial.
The statute in question prohibits any corporation or labor organi-
zation from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection
with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential elec-
tors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for . . . ." Fines and
imprisonment are provided for violation of the statute. Justice
Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, held that the expenditure
alleged came within the language of the statute. His opinion re-
views the movement for reform, which began in the '90's, and
3077 Sup. Ct. at 336.
3177 Sup. Ct. 529 (1957).
2 62 STAT. 723 (1948), amended 63 STAT. 90 (1949), 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1952).
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notes that it was first directed against corporations and in recent
years has been directed at unions. Justice Frankfurter is unanswer-
able in his argument and conclusion that Congress intended in the
Corrupt Practices Act to reach expenditures of the type charged
in the instant indictment.
The Court refused to rule on claims by the union that the
statute abridged freedom of speech and of the press and the right
peaceably to assemble and to petition, as well as other constitutional
rights. Justice Frankfurter stated the familiar arguments against
deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily. The questions came
to the Court "unillumined by the consideration of a single judge."
Adjudication on the merits was necessary to provide a "concrete
actual setting that sharpens the deliberative process especially de-
manded for constitutional decision."
Justice Douglas wrote a vigorous dissent, in which the Chief
Justice and Justice Black concurred. The dissenting justices were
of the opinion that labor unions and corporations have a con-
stitutional right of free speech which encompasses the right to
expend funds in expressing preferences for public office. Apparent-
ly they agreed that outright contributions could be prohibited. If
minority groups within unions or corporations are to be protected
from expenditures with which they are out of favor, specific
legislation, according to the dissent, should be passed rather than
destroy the right of the majority to exercise the right of free
speech. One may question whether the dissent makes a sound dis-
tinction between contributions and expenditures in urging that one
and not the other is subject to legislative prohibition.
EFFECT OF FALSE NON-COMMUNIST AFFIDAVITS ON UNION'S
COMPLIANCE STATUS
May the NLRB conduct a hearing on the veracity of a non-Com-
munist affidavit and, on a finding of falsity, withhold the benefits
of the Taft-Hartley Act from the affiant's union? This question
was answered in the negative in Leedom v. International Union of
Mine, Mill f§ Smelter Workers." A complaint of unfair labor prac-
tice was made against the Precision Scientific Company. During
the hearing before the NLRB examiner the company challenged
the non-Communist affidavits filed by a union officer. At first
the Board refused to consider the challenge, but later a hearing
was held. Findings were made that a particular affidavit was false
3877 Sup. Ct. 154 (1956).
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and that the union knew it was false but continued to re-elect the
affiant as an officer. The NLRB entered an order that the union
was not in compliance with §9(h) of the National Labor Relations
Act and that it should be barred from procedures under the Act.
The union sought injunction against the decompliance order in
a federal district court. Injunction was denied, but the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. 4 On certiorari the
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Justice Douglas delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Section 9 (h) states, "The provisions of section 3 5A of the Criminal
Code shall be applicable in respect to . . . [non-Communist] af-
fidavits." The Court was of the view that the only remedy for a
false affidavit was criminal prosecution under the section cited.
Justice Douglas wrote that § 9(h) is intended to provide an
incentive for unions to rid themselves of Communist leadership
and to elect officers who can file true affidavits. Filing of the
affidavits is the key making available to a union the benefits of the
Taft-Hartley Act. The legislative history of the Act was reviewed
and the conclusion reached that Congress did not intend for the
NLRB to try the truth or falsity of the affidavits. For the NLRB
to assume this duty would be to produce all manner of delays in
complaint and representation proceedings. Justice Douglas took
pains to say that the facts in the instant case were extreme and
that they should not be allowed to cause adoption of an interpre-
tation that would do great harm to unions that unknowingly elect
officers who make false affidavits or where there is conflict in the
evidence as to whether an officer swore falsely. The penalty, under
the statute, was to be assessed against the officer, not the union.
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL-CIO v. NLRB" goes a step
beyond the Smelter Workers case. There the officer making the
affidavit was convicted of perjury and was re-elected by the union.
Nevertheless, the union was held not barred from filing charges
of unfair labor practices against an employer. The NLRB had no
power to issue a decompliance order, the only sanction being criminal
prosecution of the officer who swore falsely.
This writer agrees that it would be unwise and impractical to
clutter up complaint and petition proceedings with a hearing and
trial of challenges of non-Communist affidavits. The statute certain-
ly permits the interpretation adopted by the Court. Perhaps a dis-
tinction might have been made with respect to affidavits of con-
34226 F.2d 780 (195;).
3577 Sup. Ct. 159 (1956).
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victed. officers who are re-elected. But the distinction would have
to be based on a conviction that is final, and, ordinarily, the chall-
enged affidavit would be different from that on which the con-
viction was founded. Proof that an affidavit is false would not
establish automatically that a later affidavit is false. It would be a
rare case in which the conviction of an officer becomes final at a
time when his false affidavit is still outstanding, he is re-elected
and his union desires to initiate a complaint or petition proceeding.
DuTY OF EMPLOYER TO FURNISH INFORMATION AS PART OF DuTY
TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co." was a per curiam decision up-
holding the Board's order that the employer should comply with a
union's request for a list of employees, their hours and wages during
the week preceding the date on which the collective bargaining
contract of the parties was entered into. The NLRB was said to
have "acted within its allowable discretion in finding that under
the circumstances of this case failure to furnish the wage informa-
tion constituted an unfair labor practice." The Court cited NLR.B
v. Truitt Mfg. Co.,' in which an employer was required to give
information substantiating its claim of inability to pay a wage
increase requested by the collective bargaining agent of the em-
ployees. On the same day certiorari was denied in Taylor Forge &
Pipes Works v. NLRB," wherein an employer was required to furn-
ish information concerning its "point ratings" in fixing hourly,
wages for different classifications. Earlier, the writ was denied in
Item Co. v. NLRB," wherein an employer was required to furnish
information as to merit increases even though its contract with the
collective bargaining representative left the ratings within the em-
ployer's control.
These several cases demonstrate that the duty of an employer
to bargain collectively encompasses a broad duty to furnish in-
formation in order that the employees' representative may carry
out its functions properly. The representative has a right to in-
formation, not readily available to it from other sources, which
will enable it to bargain understandingly and to police the ad-
ministration of the current contract.
3677 Sup. Ct. 261 (1956), rev'g 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956).
3'351 U.S. 149 (1956).
3877 Sup. Ct. 265 (1956). The Board's order was enforced in 234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir.
1956).
"877 Sup. Ct. 217 (1956). The Board's order was enforced in 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.
1955).
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CONCLUSION
The writer has dealt with a disjointed subject matter."0 The
blame, however, lies with the U. S. Supreme Court. Its decisions
have treated diverse problems. Of course, circumstances and acci-
dent determine the procession of cases to the Supreme Court, and
no one expects a unitary development of law under the Taft-
Hartley Act during each term of the Court. What is expected
is a thorough and judicious resolution of the particular cases that
come before the Court. This writer is of no mind to say that the
Court has not performed according to this expectation, even
though disagreement with a particular decision (or decisions) is
expressed.
40 After the present paper was prepared, Office Employees Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB,
77 Sup. Ct. 798 (1957), was decided. In this case charges of unfair labor practices were
brought against a group of Teamster unions. The Court had no difficulty in holding that the
Teamster unions were acting as an "employer" within the definition of § 2(2) of the Taft-
Hartley Act. The main question was whether the Board could, "by the application of general
standards of classification, refuse to assert any jurisdiction over labor unions as a class when
they act as employers." The Board had declined to take jurisdiction, saying that labor organ-
izations "are institutions unto themselves within the framework of this country's economic
scheme" and that the reasons for exempting non-profit employers should govern. The Court
held that "such an arbitrary blanket exclusion of union employers as a class is beyond the
power of the Board." The Court stated that up until this case the Board had never recog-
nized "a blanket rule of exclusion over all non-profit employers;" that it was unrealistic to
put labor unions in the same class with other non-profit employers; and that Congress did
not intend to allow the Board such a broad power of exclusion.
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